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S U B J E C T I V E P R E F E R E N C E S , R A T I O N A L I T Y , 
A N D J U S T I C E 
A B S T R A C T . Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the 
use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into 
difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism. 
1. T Y P E S O F S U B J E C T I V E E T H I C S 
It is the fundamental thesis of subjectivism in ethics that moral concepts 
are definable on the basis of subjectiye preferences. This basis is strictly 
empirical. The individual preferences may be determined by observa-
tions and experiments in principle. They are taken over into the definition 
of moral concepts as they are given and in their totality. No moral 
yardstick is applied to them; no attempt is made to cancel out morally 
irrelevant or illegitimate interests. Subjectivism, then, is a naturalistic 
theory. 
With respect to their ideas about the relation between individual 
preferences and the moral preference ordering four main types of subjec-
tivism may be distinguished: 
1.1. Individualistic subjectivism holds that every statement about values 
contains a (hidden) parameter referring to a specific individual, If we say, 
something is good, what we mean in fact is that it is good for somebody, 
for the speaker, e.g. 'Moral ' preferences, then, are relative to persons 
and coincide with their individual preferences, so that there really are no 
moral values beyond subjective values for individuals. Morality in this 
way is relativized and there is no attempt to construct a transsubjective 
preference ordering. 
1.2. Rationalistic subjectivism maintains that what is morally good coin-
cides with what is good for everybody in the long run. The maximes of 
morality, therefore, are nothing eise than the maximes of rationality, and 
these, properly conceived, are the same for all individuals. He acts 
morally good, who Iets himself be governed by "Pamour éclairé de 
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nous-mêmes", as d'Alembert put it. Here again morality coincides with 
self-interest, but the difference against individual subjectivism is, that 
the self-interests are conceived as being identical in the long run. 
1.3. Altruistic subjectivism takes the view that individual preferences are 
aggregates of an egoistic and an altruistic component, where the compo-
nents may have different weights for different persons. The first derives 
from our self-interest, the second from our benevolence toward others, 
from a concern for their self-interests. The altruistic component, there-
fore, is conceived as an aggregation of the individual self-interests. The 
moral preference ordering is identical with the benevolent component in 
the individual preferences, which is the same for all persons and therefore 
coincides, not wholly as in rationalistic subjectivism, but at least partly 
with the individual orderings. 
1.4. Social subjectivism, finally, determines the moral preference order-
ing by aggregating individual interests, without claiming, however, that 
this ordering coincides fully or partly with the individual orderings. 
Of these four types individualistic subjectivism is the least interesting 
one. It is closely related to emotivism, and only distinguished from it by 
treating moral statements as descriptive ones, i.e. as being true or false. It 
is clearly inadequate, since there is a substantial difference of meaning 
between the two types of statements This is morally good' and This is 
good for me\ They are not even extensionally equivalent. A lie may be 
good (advantageous) for me without being morally good, even in my own 
judgment. There are a number of other arguments against individualism, 
but we shall not go into them here but be concerned exclusively with the 
more interesting other types of subjectivism in the following. 
The primary goal of these approaches is to develop a theory of justice as 
a theory of fair and reasonable compromise between conflicting indi-
vidual interests in situations where all participants are interested in 
cooperating with the others, because the success of their actions depends 
on what the others do. Moral principles are not limited to the maximes of 
justice, of course, but justice, certainly, is the central social virtue, and 
social ethics again is the core of any moral philosophy. A justification of 
principles of justice, therefore, would be a decisive step towards estab-
lishing a useful moral theory. 
2. R A T I O N A L I S M 
The thesis of rationalism that an enlightened egoism is a sufficiënt basis 
for moral behavior seems, on first glance, scarcely more interesting than 
that of individualism. We are all acquainted only too well with situations 
in which the postulates of morality conflict with our self-interests. But 
rationalism is in fact one of the oldest ethical doctrines. One of the first 
moral maximes we find in the history of Greek thought is Chilon's advice: 
"öpa réXog" ("Think of the consequences"), and the idea that the good is 
what is truly advantageous for man, is prominent throughout antiquity.1 
It was taken up with new emphasis by Spinoza and Hobbes 2 at the 
beginning of the enlightenment, which laid the foundations of modern 
subjectivism. 
But let us turn from ancestry to arguments. The schema of rationalistic 
argumentation, bared from psychological and sociological embellish-
ments, is this: 
As social beings we depend on Cooperation with our fellows in almost 
all domains of life. Cooperation yields a better life for all than the war of 
each against all. Therefore it is in the common interest to agree on rules or 
establish Conventions for cooperative action in recurrent situations of 
specific types so that everybody, when such a Situation arises, may rely on 
the others doing their part. The social roles of the people may change in 
the different situations, and nobody knows beforehand in what role he 
will find himself when such a Situation arises, whether he will function as 
debtor or creditor, seller or buyer, giving or receiving orders etc. Hence it 
is rational for everybody to consent to rules that keep the possible 
disadvantage as small as possible, i.e. to rules that maximize the advan-
tage of the most disadvantaged social roles. For it might be himself to 
whom one of the least attractive positions is assigned. 
This principle for the choice of rules for Cooperation, however, which is 
a postulate of individual rationality, is also a maxime of justice. It takes 
into account the interests of all concerned in an impartial way, and even in 
a strongly egalitarian manner. 
The choice of such rules is not only rational in some Rawlesian 'original 
Position', i.e. before the situations to which the rule applies actually come 
up, but also when the 'veil of ignorance' has dropped and when, in some 
specific Situation, we find ourselves in one of the more fortunate social 
roles in which the rule demands some sacrifice from us. We know that 
such situations will come up again, and since we may then be in the worst 
Position we should not endanger our prospects by breaking the agree-
ment, which lowers our risk in future contingencies. 
This argument can be stated in game-theoretical terms and we shall do 
so now to make it, and what we have to say to it, more precise. 
Let ƒ = { 1 , . . . , n) (n ^ 2) be a set of persons who in some Situation can 
choose between acts from a set F = {fu . . . , fm) (M^ 2) 3. R = Fn is to be 
the set of possible results of actions of the iel in 5. On R n Utility-
functions u{ are to be defined such that u,(x) for x eR is the subjective, 
individual Utility of result x for person /. We shall assume an interpersonal 
comparability of the Utilities, so that the u( are determined uniquely up to 
common positive linear transformations. 
The game G = (7, F, w), where u is the n-tuple (uu .. ., un), is to be 
cooperative, i.e. the players can communicate with each other and form 
agreements as to which result is to be realized. 
If the game is played only once a cooperative result should be 
in the negotiation set N = PD{x: Ai(u"^ (*))}, where P = 
{x: Ay(Vi(ui(x)<ul(y))^> Vk(uk(y)< uk(x)))} is the set of Pareto-
optimal results and u(- = max^ minx:{x)= fUj(x) is the security level of the 
game for player /. (x){ is to be the ith member of the n-tuple x4 
We need not try to narrow down the set of rational cooperative 
Solutions by further criteria, which would be highly controversial anyhow. 
The sole reason for mentioning the above condition for such Solutions is 
to point out, that rational compromises depend on the natural advan-
tages, here: on the security levels, of the players. 
This is also true if the game is played repeatedly and joint mixed 
strategies are employed. Then the security level u* of / is what player / 
can guarantee himself by adopting a separate mixed strategy. But the 
Situation changes completely if we assume that before each match starts it 
is decided by lot which role each player has to take. In this case we have to 
distinguish the set ƒ, which now is to be the set of roles, and the set 
F = { F i , . . . , Pn} of players. We assume that in role / every player has 
Utilities expressed by uh This means that all players have Utilities, which, 
on condition that they are assigned role /, are determined by the utility-
function w, for that role. The players then need not be without prefer-
ences before the play starts, as in Rawls' original position, but their 
preferences change with the roles they have to take. 
If we assume now, that the players cannot assign probabilities to the 
events that they draw one or another of the roles, then the maximin-
criterion for decision under uncertainty teils them: 
( K l ) Agree on a result x for which min ut(x) is maximal. 
This criterion applies both to single and repeated performances of the 
game. The important difference between these two cases arises only, if 
the lots have been drawn for some match and the roles distributed. Then a 
player Ph for instance, may find that he is in a role k for which uk(x) < u°k, 
where x is the result agreed upon in accordance with (KI). If the game is 
played only once then it might be profitable for P( - even if possible 
sanctions by the others are considered - to break the agreement and 
adopt this security strategy which guarantees him at least w£. But if the 
game is repeated afterwards sufficiently often, then his possible loss will 
outweigh his momentary gain uk-uk(x), since if in the future he always 
gets the worst part k' (for which we have uk>{x)>uk> for all non-trivial 
games) his possible losS after n repetitions is n • (uk>(x) — uk>). 
If probabilities pik of Pt getting part k are known (£* pik = 1 for all /), 
then we have a decision under risk and (expected) natural advantages 
come in again, since each player can determine his future prospects if he 
acts alone or in coalitions. If each player, however, has the same chance of 
getting every part, i.e. if we have pik = l//t for all / and k, then the 
criterion of maximizing their expected Utilities teils them: 
(K2) Agree on a result x for which £ W,-(JC) is maximal. 
And here, as in ( K l ) , natural advantages are irrelevant. The derivation 
of this utilitarian principle of justice from considerations of rationality, 
however, is based on the rather implausible assumption of equal known 
probabilities for all roles. Therefore we have referred only to (KI) in our 
intuitive argument above and will mainly refer to it in what follows. But, 
given the prerequisites of its derivation, (K2) is a true principle of justice 
also, since, even if somebody has to pay a big price for the greater 
well-being of others in some Situation, he will find comfort in the 
knowledge that in the long run he will be equally well off as the others 
with this arrangement. 
After stating the rationalistic argument in more formal terms let us now 
point out its difficulties. The most important objections against it may be 
summed up as follows: 
1. The Problem of Realism 
The rationalistic argument rests on assumptions about the type of social 
situations to which norms of justice apply. It is questionable whether 
these assumptions are realistic. 
la . Uncertainty of the Social Roles. There are many roles which alter-
nate in the course of life for a person, and we have named some above. 
But there are also many roles that accompany a person throughout his life 
(sex, talents, training, e.g.) or roles, a change in which is improbable 
(profession, membership in social groups, e.g.). But this implies that for 
such roles the maximes of rationality ( K l ) (or (K2)) are superseded by 
criteria oriented to people's natural advantages, and rational behaviour 
does not anymore coincide with what justice prescribes. 
Ib. Repetition of the Situations. There are situations, in which we find 
ourselves only very seldomly and which are unlikely to repeat themselves. 
Take a Situation where someone is drowning and you can save him only 
with considerable risk to your own life. Since the roles in this Situation are 
known and the small chance that one day they will be reversed is even 
further diminished if you do what morality prescribes, the postulates of 
rationality will be markedly different from those of morality. Generally 
speaking, in the long run we will all be dead, and therefore criteria of 
rationality which presuppose that the same situations will be repeated 
again and again are not very realistic. 
lc . Identity of Conditional Preferences. It is highly probable that there 
are basically different individual preference-structures; that different 
people often have different preferences even if they act in the same roles.5 
But if the conditional preferences are not identical, ( K l ) (or (K2)) are not 
anymore generally acceptable criteria for rational behavior. 
2. The Problem of Different Rationality Concepts 
It has often been pointed out that the maximin-criterion is not adequate 
in all situations of decision under uncertainty. If I have to choose between 
two acts / and g, e.g., in a Situation where the outcomes depend on 
whether p or not-p obtains, and if my Utilities for the outcomes are 0 for ƒ 
and p, 100 for / and non-p, and 0.1 for both g and /?, and g and non-p, then 
I certainly would not do g as advocated by the maximin-rule. This rule 
seems adequate only if great risks are involved, i.e. if the maximin 
strategy is much safer than other ones. Even if, for the sake of the 
argument, we concede that social choices generally involve great risks, it 
still should be pointed out, that there is no purely 'rational' criterion for 
pref erring pessimistic maximin procedures, e.g., against an optimistic 
maximax strategy. Rather it is the other way round: such criteria define 
different concepts of rationality. So if rationalism speaks of justice 
coinciding with rationality it has to face the question: 'Rationality in what 
sense?' Different notions, or principles of rationality determine different 
notions and principles of justice in the rationalistic argument, and these 
are not any better justified than the former. 
3. The Problem of Adequacy 
3a. Morally Legitimate Interests. (K l ) and (K2) as principles of justice 
are adequate only, if they are not based just on any subjective prefer-
ences, but on morally legitimate ones. First, a theory of justice has to 
determine the range of application for its principles. (KI) certainly is not 
to be applied to parlour games or to all business transactions, e.g., but 
only to cases where morally legitimate interests of people are involved. 
Second, sadistic interests or excessive greeds should not be honored by 
(Kl) . So to exclude applications of (KI) that yield strongly counter-
intuitive results, we would have to base (Kl ) on a distinction of morally 
legitimate and morally illegitimate interests. This, however, would not 
only be contrary to the intentions of subjectivism, but it is simply 
impossible within the framework of this theory. To justify moral criteria 
by reference to individual preferences, and then say that some of the 
preferences are unjustified by these criteria would be grossly circular.6 
Furthermore, while principles of justice call for a restriction to morally 
legitimate interests, considerations of rationality exclude it. For a sadist it 
is not moral, but certainly rational to insist on his perverse interests to be 
honoured by society. So even if the distinction could be drawn on 
subjectivist grounds, it would, by marking the point where the principles 
of justice deviate from those of rationality, still show the untenability of 
rationalism. 
3b. Inclusiveness. If the group P of players is taken to be humanity as a 
whole, including present and future generations, then the presupposi-
tions of the rationalistic argument (unknown or equal chances for all 
social roles, equal preferences in equal roles, cooperative action) become 
extremely unrealistic. But if, on the other hand, we want to make them 
more realistic by taking P to be a relatively small and homogenous group, 
cohering by social interaction, then the postulates ( K l ) or (K2) lose their 
moral character since they disregard the interests of outsiders. Thus there 
is a conflict between realism and adequacy which cannot be resolved. 
That the extremely conservative character of the maximin rule (K l ) 
also poses a problem of adequacy has already been pointed out above. 
A l l these objections, with the exception of (2), seem to be decisive. 
They show that, if the maximes of justice are to be anything like ( K l ) or 
(K2), they are rational only in some very specific cases. 
3. S O C I A L S U B J E C T I V I S M 
The theory of justice in social subjectivism today coincides largely with 
the theory of social welfare. Although economists usually try to refrain 
from explicit moral considerations, there is frequent reference to fairness 
and like moral concepts. And this, of course, is to be expected since the 
theory is not to be descriptive and criteria of individual rationality do not 
suffice to single out certain social welfare functions (SWF). 
If ƒ = { 1 , . . . , n) is a group of individuals again, Z a set of social states, 
w = (w i , . . . , wn) a / i -tuple of individual Utility functions on Z , as specified 
above, or r = (ru . . . , rn) a n-tuple of individual preference orderings on 
Z , then a SWF R (r) (or R (u)) is a f unction which assigns to every possible 
r (or w) o n Z a social preference ordering R(r) (or R(u)) on Z . 7 If Z is 
finite, as we shall assume here, the set 0R{r) := {x: Ay(yR(r)x)} of 
optimal results is not empty, and the maxime of social subjectivism is 
(K3) Choose a result of 0R(r). 
Among the many SWF's that have been proposed in the literature 
there is not one that has been generally accepted, so that it has been 
doubted whether there exists a single SWF that is appropriate for all 
cases, i.e. an appropriate SWF for all sets Z and all r (or u) on Z . 
A central issue, e.g., is the conflict between equality and efficiency. If the 
inequality in state x is measured by the Gini-coefficient, for instance: 
(for ui{x) ^u2(x)^ ... &un(x)9 and for U(x) := L «,-(*)) then a SWF 
exclusively oriented towards equality would be xRx{u)y := G(y,u)^ 
G(x, u). 
But this function does not satisfy the Pareto-condition 
(PI) Arxy(Ai(xr(y) A Vk(xpéy)^xP(r)y) 
(where xpty := —i(yr^) and xP{r)y := -i(yR(r)x)) which is an extremely 
plausible condition for SWF's. 
On the other hand the utilitarian function 
which satisfies (PI) and is oriented exclusively toward efficiency ('the 
greatest happiness of greatest number') admits of gross inequalities.8 In 
cases where equality is only to be had at the price of a considerable 
disadvantage for all or most people, Ri is clearly inadequate, while R2 is 
inappropriate if some individuals have to pay the price for a big total 
Profit. 
If we try to combine the merits of the two functions we run into trouble, 
however. The general idea would be something like this: The social Utility 
Us(x, ü) is to be a weighted mean of the w,(x), the weights depending on x 
in such a way that the Utilities of persons worse off in x (for u) count more 
1 2 
n n • U(x) 
(ux(x) + 2 • u2(x)+ . . . +n • un(x)) 
xR2(u)y := U(x)^U(y)9 
heavily than those of the persons better situated in x. We then arrivé at 
the following definitions 
Dia ) Us(x,u):=—=—: and 
Lat{x, u) 
(Dlb) xR(u)y := Us(x, u) ^ U5(y, u), 
where 
ul(x)<uk(x)^al(x, u)>ak(xy u). 
If we take only the order of positions of the individuals in x into 
account, we may set al(x,u) = r for ieGn where Gr is the group of 
persons in the rth best position in x for u. In case we have ux{x)> ... > 
un(x) we then obtain 
(D2) t/s(x, w) = = —rTll+ — G U , « ) . 
2, / w +1 \ w / 
Us(x,u) therefore increases with U(x) (efficiency) and 1 + — 
G(JC, u) (equality). But R(u) still does not satisfy ( P I ) , and R(u), further-
more, is unsatisfactory since it only takes the orders of the individual 
welfares into account and not their utility differences. 
Therefore it seems to be better to determine the weights at(xy u) as 
differences between ut(x) and some fixed parameter like U(x). This gives 
us 
(D3) Us(x9 u) = — . 
U(x)(n-l) 
The function R(r) then satisfies ( P I ) , but R(u) is not invariant with 
respect to (common) linear transformations of the u„ since Us(x, u) is not 
a linear function of the uh9 
The disagreements in the theory of SWF's are not confined to specific 
SWF's, however, they also relate to conditions of adequacy for SWF's, 
with the possible exception of ( P I ) and the postulate of anonymity (or 
impartiality). The apparent plausibility of many postulates that have been 
proposed, is shaken if one looks at the consequences they have in 
connection with other equally plausible candidates.1 0 Therefore we shall 
not try to criticize special SWF's or special conditions of adequacy here on 
the grounds that, with respect to the SWF's they propose, (K3) is not an 
intuitive adequate principle of justice. Most of what may be said in this 
respect has already been said in the literature. We shall instead raise an 
objection that applies to all possible SWF's. 
4. T H E P R O B L E M O F C O N S I S T E N C Y 
Subjective preferences are subject to moral evaluations. This is true even 
if social states are the primary objects of such evaluations as in subjectiv-
ism. For if some social state is good then an action which brings it about is 
good, and therefore the subjective preference is good from which this 
action derives by rational decision - given correct and sufficiënt Informa-
tion about relevant circumstances. We cannot say that only a person's 
actions are morally relevant, not his subjective preferences. Since it 
certainly is morally alright to act rationally, it follows that if we allow 
certain preferences we also allow the actions based on them by rational 
decision. 
Let us say, that the subjective preference ordering ^ , of person i is 
legitimate relatively to the moral preference ordering ^ . iff for all states x 
and y we have x < .y => x < ,y. 
Now every subjectivistic theory which does not claim, as individualism 
and rationalism do, that moral preferences coincide with the subjective 
ones, admitting therefore conflicts between the two (in the sense that we 
have x < .y and y < tx for some person /) faces the following dilemma: As 
a subjective theory it bases its definition of moral preference on subjec-
tive preferences as they are. It can either say that these subjective 
preferences are no object of moral evaluation, or it can maintain, that 
their moral values derive from the preference ordering defined from 
them. Now after what was said above the first position can not be 
interpreted to mean that it is impossible or irrelevant to apply moral 
criteria to subjective preferences. Therefore it must be taken to imply 
that all subjective preferences are morally indifferent, i.e. permitted. But 
this is a postulate for the moral preference ordering which is independent 
and therefore possibly inconsistent with its explicit definition. And such 
an inconsistency obtains in all cases of conflict in which actual subjective 
preferences are not legitimate with respect to the moral valuation derived 
from them. 
According to the second approach there is no independent stipulation 
about the moral legitimacy of the given subjective preferences. But some 
of them may in fact turn out to be illegitimate, i.e. forbidden, and then it is 
a postulate of morality that they should be changed. But doing so might 
upset the moral preference ordering which is based not on legitimate but 
on given preferences. So there is a feedback effect here and the whole 
System of subjective preferences determining the moral Standards by 
definition and being in turn redetermined by them may be unstable. 
This problem can also be illustrated in a formal way by the following 
impossibility result. 
If some or all of the individuals in I accept the social preference 
ordering R(r) and make it their own, this ordering should not be 
disturbed thereby. If some people accept a moral maxime this should not 
change its content. Otherwise the maxime would have to be spelled out 
like this: Prefer x to y, but if you (or somebody eise) should actually do 
so, stop doing so and prefer y to x instead, and so on. Therefore it seems 
adequate to postulate that every SWF be consistent in the following 
sense: 
(P2) Arxyi(xR(r)y^xR(r/*{r))y), 
where r/fir) is to be the n-tuple (ru . . . , r^u R(r)y r , - + 1 , . . . , rn).u 
This is a very strong condition, which is not satisfied by the utilitarian 
SWF, e.g. It is satisfied by the maximin-relation, but this does not satisfy 
(PI). In fact it can easily be seen that there is no SWFÄ(r ) which satisfies 
(PI), (P2) and the extremely weak indifference postulate 
(P3) Vrixy(xE(r)y Axpty).12 
This condition is very plausible, for otherwise we should have for all r, x 
and y: xE(r)y => Ai(xe(y), i.e. two states would only be socially indifferent 
if they are indifferent for all individuals, but not if the contrary interests of 
people balance each other. 
Finally, social subjectivism again faces the difficulties of morally legiti-
mate interests and inclusiveness. Inclusivity is here in conflict with the fact 
that to determine the SWF for a group I of individuals, their preferences 
have to be known. Short of prophecy this condition cannot be fulfilled for 
future generations. 
P R E F E R E N C E S , R A T I O N A L I T Y , A N D J U S T I C E 109 
5. A L T R U I S T I C S U B J E C T I V I S M 
Altruistic subjectivism was the alternative that J. Butler and, after him, 
D. Hume put against Hobbes' thesis, that egoism is the only true motive 
of human action. According to Butler and Hume many actions and 
attitudes can only be explained if we assume an altruistic component in 
our preferences besides the egoistic one. According to the basic idea the 
altruistic component is conceived of as an aggregation of the egoistic 
individual preferences. If U(x, u) is a social Utility function defined from 
the individual egoistic Utilities w, of the persons i e ƒ, for instance the 
utilitarian function U(x,u) = L W,-(JC), then the effective or total Utility of / 
is given by 
ut(x) = ei • W/OO + U U ( x , u ) . 
Here et is f s coëfficiënt of egoism. ut(x) therefore is a weighted mean of 
fs self-interest and benevolence, in Hume's terminology. We shall 
assume O ^ ex < 1 for all / e I. (For e, = 1 P( would have no altruistic 
component.) 
While Hume seems to think of U(x,u) as the utilitarian function, any 
function U(x, u) determined by a satisfactory SWF R(u) might be 
employed here. So the first problem for altruism is the same as that for 
social subjectivism: Which function U(xyu) should we choose? 
Although in this approach the effective individual preferences contain 
a component that coincides with the moral preference defined by 
xR(u)y := U(x, u)^ U(y> u), these preferences are not identical with it, 
i.e. conflicts between an effective individual preference and the moral 
preference may arise, and therefore this approach also faces the problem 
(4) of consistency. 
Some further problems are: 
(1) Why should U(x, u) only take the egoistic Utilities ué of the 
individuals into account and not their effective Utilities K somebody 
has strong moral interests why should only his egoistic and not his moral 
preferences be heeded by the others' benevolence? This indeed, seems 
inadequate, and even more so if we think of a restriction of U(x,u) to 
morally legitimate interests, as advocated in objection (3a) (which may 
also be directed against the present theory). But if the function U would 
refer to the ut instead of the ut its definition would be circular. 
(2) How are we to distinguish egoistic and altruistic interests in a 
subjectivistic approach? This problem is mirrored in Hume's theory, 
since he originally also included a limited generosity, a concern for the 
well-being of close relatives or friends, into the egoistic component. A 
concern for the interests of others may also be based on egoistic consider-
ations in some cases, cases, e.g., for which the rationalistic thesis holds. So 
it should be rather difficult to draw a sharp line between egoistic and 
altruistic interests. 
(3) Finally, as in the cases of rationalism and of social subjectivism, 
there is a conflict between realism and intuitive acceptability: We can 
only respect the interests of the others if we know about them, and we 
shall know them only if I is a relatively small group. But then R(u) is not 
adequate as a moral preference relation, since it pays no heed to the 
interests of people outside / . 
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N O T E S 
1 It is extremely interesting to see how moral problems slowly emerged from considerations 
of usefulness in Greek antiquity. This process is not only documented in philosophical and 
poetical writings, but also in the growing differentiation of the pertinent semantic fields of 
the language. 
2 Spinoza says, for instance: "Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud nobis est, quam ex düctu 
rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare (haec tria idem significant) ex fundamento 
proprium utile quaerere" (Eth. IV, prop. XX) ('To act virtuously is nothing eise than to act 
and live rationally, to conserve one's own being (these three are the same), and to serve ones 
own real interests".) 
3 If the individuals have different sets F{ of acts to choose from (j'~ 1 , . . . , n), we can always 
redefine the acts so that they can choose from the same set of acts. So no loss of generality is 
involved in assuming this. 
4 The domains of the variables here and in what follows are: i, ky... el, x, y, z , . . . eR, 
ƒ,/, . . . E { l , . . . , m } / , g , ...eF. 
5 If one were to define the social roles so that they also determine the preference structures 
of the people playing these roles, it would be improbable that some people should play some 
roles, and the difficuities would then only be transfered back to (la). 
6 J. Rawls' theory of justice in (72) is not a rationalistic theory. His original position is a 
purely fictitious Situation and therefore a proof that the principles of justice are principles of 
rational choice in this Situation does not entail, and is not supposed to entail, that in 
actual situations it is rational to act upon them. (Rawls' attempt to show-mainly by 
psychological considerations - that there is no conflict between rationality and justice has 
not been very successful.) But his theory has many parallels with rationalism, and Rawls, 
too, encounters something like the problem, of morally legitimate interests. His Solution, 
developed in the 4thin theory of the good', is not applicable to (3a), however. Primary goods 
are defined as such that the possession of them (to a certain measure) is a prerequisite for 
realizing any plan of life, i.e. any individual preferences, however different they may be. A n 
interest in (this measure of) these goods is certainly legitimate, but it is also certain that not 
all legitimate interests are interests in primary goods. Therefore the principles of justice 
would be too weak if they were restricted to such interests. 
7 This characterization of SWF's implies the postulate of unrestricted domain and the 
postuiates of ordering xR(r)y v yR(r)x and xR(r)y AyR(r)z =>xR(r)z. 'jci?(r)y' is to be 
read as 'state x is socially not better than state y\ The rt are to be interpreted likewise, so 
that we have xr(y s u((x)^ w,(y). R(u) is to be invariant with respect to common positive 
linear transformations of the w,. These are rather strong postuiates, but our critique of social 
subjectivism will not depend essentially on them. We make these assumptions only for the 
sake of simplicity. - Z may also be the set of results of a game. Then R(r) does not just 
determine what the members of I should prefer, but what they should do. - For a 
comprehensive exposition of the theory of SWF's see A . Sen (1970). 
8 J. Harsanyi has pointed out that in some cases, for instance distribution problems with 
concave individual Utility functions, we have x e 0R2(r) for states x of equal distribution. 
9 J. Harsanyi has pointed out this defect in connection with Sen's weak equity axiom (cf. Sen 
(1973), p. 18). There are other, linear SWF's of course, combining the aspects of efficiency 
and equality, for instance xR(u)y '=xP3(u)y vxE3(u)y v xR4(u)y, where xR3(u)y : = 
Ai(Ui(x)^Ui(y))v Vi(Ui(x)<Ui(y)), xE3(u)y:=xR3(u)y vyR3(u)x and xR4(u)y :=minf 
^ ( J C ) ^ min, My). Cf. (76), pp. 71 seq. 
But this relation is oriented towards efficiency only so long as unamimity obtains. So it 
refers the conflict between efficiency and equality to the Pareto-optimal set P of Z and there 
it is purely egalitarian in so far as it promotes the interests of those worst off at the cost of the 
others. 
1 0 This is witnessed especially by the impossibility results. 
1 1 (P2) is a consequence of the postulate Arr'{Azz'{zr'z' =>zR(r)z') =>Aixy(xR(r)y = 
xR(r/r-)y)) which says that R(r) is to be invariant with respect to substitutions of preference 
orderings r' for rt which are legitimate with respect to R{r). 
1 2 E i s defined as in Note 9. - If r, /, x, y are as postulated in (P3) we can set r'k = R (r) for all 
k * i and /•;- r,-. Then (PI) teils us that xP(r')y, which violates (P2). For a S WF £ (w) defined 
by a function U(u) and xR(u)y s U(x, u)^U(y,u), like the utilitarian or the maximin 
relation, (P2) would have to be formulated as Auxyi(xR(u)y =xR(u/Y(u))y). 
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